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Chapter 8 
Congo-Gauteng: Congolese Migrants in South Africa  
Saint José Inaka and Joseph Trapido 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an overview of migration from the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) to South Africa concentrating on one region, Gauteng. Our 
research is primarily based on ethnographic fieldwork by the authors, with 
additional material from the library and the press.  
Outside of frontier states, South Africa is the principal destination for 
the Congolese. Migration there is the subject of a voluminous body of 
literature (e.g. Gelderblom et al. 2006). Yet despite this and the large numbers 
of Congolese in South Africa, relatively little has been written about this 
migration stream. People on the move represent a striking feature of 
contemporary sociality (Urry 2010) and links between the DRC and South 
Africa will, we believe, form an important ‘south-south’ relationship in the new 
century. Looking at the concrete aspirations and activities of Congolese 
migrants, we attempt a broad overview as a basis for further investigation. 
Congolese migration to South Africa has the potential to develop mutually 
beneficial contacts between South Africa, the DRC and the broader Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) area. Yet the prevailing system 
promotes negative outcomes, penalizing and criminalizing socially useful 
labour at the bottom of the social scale, while rewarding and consolidating a 
violent rentier class at the top. 
 
Congo-Paris and Other Literature on Congolese Migrants. 
 
While Congolese migration to South Africa is relatively unstudied, Congolese 
migrants to other destinations have received more attention. These include 
the ‘Bana Lunda’ who migrated to Lunda Norte in Angola to mine diamonds in 
the 1990s (e.g. De Boeck 1999; De Monnier et al. 2008). Also notable are 
studies of migration by youths such as the sapeurs and mikilistes from 
Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville (Gandolou 1989; Gondola 1999; Trapido 
2011). Most relevant here, however, is MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga’s 
Congo-Paris, Transnational Traders on the Margins of the Law (2000). With 
its highly accessible mix of vivid ethnography and practical theory, Congo-
Paris was a model for us to aspire to. Like them, we are interested in the 
economy as an important modality of human activity, while investigating ‘the 
economic’ as embedded social facts that can only be understood in the wider 
texture of human life. We also believe that migration has important 
implications for African politics in the twenty-first century.  
Our study differs from Congo-Paris in that we concentrate more on 
class divisions within the Congolese migrant community. The migration of 
Congolese to France was overwhelmingly from the Lingala-speaking west of 
the country. Migration to South Africa reflects the overall demography of 
Congo, with large numbers of migrants from both the western and eastern, 
Swahili-speaking, parts of Congo. The difference between west and east has 
become an important political divide in the DRC, with easterners and 
especially people from the south-east province of Katanga being more 
favourable to the Kabila regime (Inaka forthcoming). The linguistic divide may 
render class tensions more acute in South Africa.  
There appear to be fewer spaces of contact between elite and non-elite 
migrants In South Africa than there were in Europe during the 1990s and 
2000s, when it was common to encounter the children of senior Mobutiste 
cadres hanging out in local bars. This is surely related to the general pattern 
of geographical segregation between rich and poor that is characteristic of 
South Africa. 
In Congo-Paris the authors claim that Congolese migrants have a 
‘counter-hegemonic’ relationship to the powers that be – casting migrants as 
resisting elites both in the two Congos and in France. They draw on both 
Antonio Gramsci and James Scott, but MacGaffey herself in earlier work on 
Zaire (for example 1987) contrasted an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, based in 
an expanding informal economy,i with a parasitic state bourgeoisie whose 
revenues came from rent seeking or even predation. Our chapter disputes 
such a division; indeed rentiers – who can impose and benefit from a 
monopoly of or restricted access to an economic resource – are best placed 
to reap the informal economy’s rewards (Hyslop 2005). The state has been a 
crucial vector of informal economic activity in Zaire (Reno 1998). Even where 
‘the state’ has been entirely replaced by smaller-scale forms of authority, it is 
questionable to view informal economic agents as emancipatory. 
Raeymaekers (2010) shows how Nande traders of North Kivu, a group taken 
by MacGaffey (1987, 1997) to epitomise the resistant entrepreneur, were 
themselves inexorably drawn into the same patterns of rent seeking and 
violence once undertaken by state elites. 
It cannot be denied, however, that ordinary people have turned to the 
informal economy to put food on the table. We propose to see the informal 
economy, not as an entity with a single set of implications for society, but as a 
mode of economic behaviour. Informality is accessed by different social 
groups on different terms often corresponding to class positions. Class and 
conflicts of interest should be integral to how we think about the informal 
economy. Congolese migrants have an important relationship to informality. 
Migrants to South Africa are far from being a homogenous social group. Their 
access to ‘the informal economy’ is shaped by their class position and general 
statements about the positive or negative potential migration must take this 
into consideration. 
 
Background 
 
The DRC is the largest member of SADC, both in terms of area and 
population. With its nearly seventy million potential consumers, its cultural 
prowess, its globally important reserves of cobalt, uranium and rare non-
ferrous metals, and its vast hydroelectric potential, the DRC offers SADC a 
route to an optimistic future – culturally vibrant, jobs-rich, high-tech, low-
carbon. Yet, while it is commonplace to assert that the DRC has this huge 
potential, it is evident that it is not currently able to deliver on this potential. 
This distance between aspiration and the actuality can only be understood 
through the country’s turbulent history. 
In the early colonial period the Congo was marked by widespread 
violence, as the colonial state used ever more extreme methods to obtain 
commodities from the interior, above all wild rubber. Estimates of excess 
mortality in this period vary between three and twenty-one million (Ndaywel é 
Nziem 1998; Hochschild 2005; Vellut 2006; White 2011). These exactions 
may be seen as state-led ‘primitive accumulation’ – an act of dispossession 
that creates the conditions necessary for capitalism (Marx 1961 [1867]). Thus 
in the late colonial period the Belgian Colony was relatively industrialized and 
affluent, with the highest proportion of wage labourers in Sub-Saharan Africa 
outside South Africa (Prunier 2009). However, all of this came to an end at 
independence. 
The Belgians and other western powers were alarmed (and apparently 
surprised) that the Congolese people had voted for parties and candidates 
that promised economic independence from the former colonial power, and 
the country was immediately destabilized. The elected prime minister, Patrice 
Lumumba, was assassinated by Belgian forces. Elites in the mineral-rich 
Katanga province tried to secede, with the tacit encouragement of western 
interests; the army rebelled and the country was plunged into chaos. Mobutu 
Sese Seko, the head of the army, who had been on the Central intelligence 
Agency (CIA) payroll since before independence, took power in 1965. 
Maintaining close relations with Washington and from the 1970s onward with 
Paris, he was able to call in favours each time his power was threatened. 
Mobutu was able to keep the lid on for a while, curbing inflation, 
reducing the deficit through a managed devaluation (Young and Turner 1985) 
and instituting a moderately successful nationalization of the mines in1966.ii 
But by the mid 1970s the country was once again in a downward spiral, as a 
huge fall in copper prices, then the main export and an ill-conceived 
distribution of foreign-owned property to regime cronies, took their toll. The 
regime limped on, and when Mobutu was finally chased from power in 1997, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was, in real terms, less than 20 per cent of 
what it had been at independence (Exenberger and Hartman 2013: 31) and 
the country owed its creditors nearly thirteen billion U.S. dollars. 
Since the fall of Mobutu the country has been characterized, once 
again, by extreme violence. Disruption caused by the Congo wars of 1996 to 
1997 and 1998 to 2002, and by the turbulent ‘peace’ that came afterwards, 
has led to an estimated excess mortality of 3.9 million people – more than 
anywhere else since the end of World War II (Coghlan et al. 2006). Most of 
these deaths have not been caused by direct violence, but rather relate to 
events that are ‘economic’ and ‘political’ as much as ‘military’. These can, to 
some degree, be seen as an extension of trends that were already in place 
before the war: the collapse of roads and infrastructure, the decline in food 
production, the mass migrations of a besieged peasantry (abandoning the 
countryside en masse because of insecurity and informal ‘taxation’ by a 
plethora of armed groups) and the disappearance of anything resembling a 
public health system. 
Even outside the eastern regions that have been the primary theatre of 
conflict, the country is extraordinarily dilapidated. There has been no census 
since 1984; there is no road between the country’s largest cities, Kinshasa 
(seven to ten million people) and Lubumbashi (around three million). Mbuji-
Mayi, a city of several millions, has no piped water; Kinshasa suffers power 
cuts lasting several months a year; and most of the population has been 
reduced to a level of bare subsistence.  
 
Migration, Outline Trends 
  
Given the hardship of life in the DRC – which was ranked 187th or last in 
United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development 
Index (2011) – migration is an obviously attractive option. That being said, 
most Congolese would prefer to migrate north to Europe or North America, 
than to South Africa. This preference is clearly related to the higher standard 
of living there, but it extends well beyond simple economic calculations. 
Europe and the rich North – known as mikili in Lingala – have become the 
focus for a highly elaborated set of myths and rituals on the part of both urban 
youth and various elites. Restrictive migration policies in ‘the west’, however, 
mean that entry into these countries is now almost impossible, even for 
relatively well-off Congolese. As a result, they have increasingly turned to 
‘south-south’ migration, with important flows of commercial, educational and 
vocational migration taking place between the DRC and emerging countries – 
notably Brazil, Turkey, China, India and, above all, South Africa.  
There are no reliable figures for the number of Congolese living in 
South Africa. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
in 2006 estimated that 23,000 Congolese asylum seekers and 17,000 
refugees lived there, while the United States Committee for Refugees and 
Immigrants World Refugee Survey 2009 estimated the population of refugees 
and asylum seekers from the DRC at 33,000. Both these estimates draw on a 
baseline survey of 2003 (Belvedere 2003). It is obvious that this survey must 
have missed very large numbers of people who would be contained within a 
larger definition of the Congolese community living in South Africa. First, it 
excludes those who are not refugees or claiming asylum – students, many 
migrant workers, those who have become South African nationals and most 
members of the elite. Second, it excludes a large group of people who have 
overstayed their visa and any whose claim for asylum has been rejected but 
who continue to live on there clandestinely. Finally, it excludes those people, 
perhaps not numerous, who have bypassed official points of entry and live in 
South Africa without documentation.  
We now examine some factors relevant to a consideration of class 
among Congolese migrants to Gauteng. 
 
Particularities of Class in the DRC and Abroad 
 
Theories of class are often grouped into two schools: a Weberian emphasis 
on status and political power and a Marxist emphasis on relationship to the 
means of production. It is often taken as a vindication of the Weberian 
approach that, in states like Zaire/DRC, political power seems to have 
preceded economic power (Schatzberg 1980); but one could just as well 
argue in Marxist terms that the power of the ruling class there is based on 
extracting rent from the means of production. This might be linked to a third 
important theorist of class, Veblen (1912) offers a third approach to class, with 
his emphasis on forms of conspicuous consumption among a non-productive 
status group of ‘predators’, a class who might be also characterized as 
rentiers. Our class model, with a predatory non-productive class at the top, 
most resembles Veblen. This essay will consider ‘money’, ‘status’ and ‘power’ 
where it seems appropriate. All three elements should be included in a full 
account of social class.  
For the purpose of identifying divisions within the Congolese migrant 
community, we propose a three-class model – a class of hustlers and 
survivors at the bottom similar to those Hart (1973) once termed an ‘urban 
sub-proletariat’ (see also Davis 2006); a class of professionals, traders and 
moderately successful criminals in the middle; and at the top an elite class, 
composed of wealthy and politically well-connected individuals, who live, or 
spend significant periods, in South Africa, but whose livelihood is primarily 
guaranteed by access to rents in the DRC. Our conclusions are tentative and 
our terminology reflects this, referring to these groups simply as ‘the bottom’, 
‘the middle’, and ‘the top’. Within these broad categories we look at particular 
occupational groups – e.g. security guards, professionals, or criminals.  
The social class of migrants originate when they leave the DRC 
obviously affects the positions they occupy when they get to South Africa. 
However lowly the social position of Congolese migrants in South Africa may 
appear, they rarely come from the poorest backgrounds in the DRC. Migration 
everywhere requires more resources than those at the very bottom can often 
acquire (Massey and Durant 2006). This is true of migration to South Africa. 
While Congolese people often see this as a more accessible option compared 
with getting into the rich north, coming to South Africa from the DRC is quite 
expensive; at their closest the two countries are nearly 2,000 kilometres apart.  
Exploring class in the DRC can sometimes feel like entering a looking 
glass world, where the disasters of the post-independence state have pulled 
ordinary social terms far away from their conventional ‘western’ meanings (De 
Boeck and Plissart 2004). A wide range of professions – civil servants, school 
teachers, tax inspectors, etc. – should not be seen as being especially 
privileged. Salaries are absurdly low compared to the cost of living; public 
servants are generally paid less than 200 U.S. dollars a month and this often 
comes with several months or even years of arrears. A friend of the authors, 
who worked for the municipal tax office in Kinshasa, received a monthly salary 
of 150 U.S. dollars and this was not paid for 7 months out of 12. Yet penury 
has not necessarily disrupted class hierarchies. In relative terms, 
professionals are still better placed than the great mass of hawkers, vegetable 
gardeners, peanut sellers, sweeps, sentinels, roadside cooks, moonshine 
brewers, drug sellers and prostitutes who struggle to wrest a living from the 
DRC’s urban centres. But this advantage is due, in large measure, not to their 
feeble salaries but to other privileges that they enjoy. One advantage is that 
jobs in the tax office or for the state power company can be a source of 
informal fees. But the most important advantages concern property and social 
connections. The current crop of downtrodden professionals are quite often 
the children of an earlier generation of professionals who came to maturity 
when housing was cheaper, when salaries were paid and before runaway 
inflation took hold. Thus a badly-paid civil servant is probably in a position to 
live at home with his parents. He is also more likely than most to have access 
to circuits of migrant capital.  
So general impoverishment in Congo presents a counter-intuitive set of 
social facts – while the middle classes have been reduced to near 
subsistence level, those beneath them have also experienced a fall in their 
standard of living and relative class positions have remained similar. For 
migrants, the opposite may be true. A considerable improvement of their 
material standard of living in South Africa often coincides with downward 
mobility in terms of relative position and occupational class. It is not 
uncommon for car guards in South Africa to have been professionals with a 
degree in Congo. But they often earn much more in tips from South African 
drivers than their salary from the Congolese state. 
Informal and illegal economic activities often play an important role in 
migrants’ lives. These may be characterized as ‘survival strategies’ 
undertaken by people at the bottom of the heap. The various social groups 
relate to informality differently and the degree of choice they exercise is 
crucial. Those at the bottom are involved in what we call ‘forced informality’. 
Arriving without the money needed to regularize their situation, they are 
prevented by law from finding formal employment. The informal opportunities 
available restrict their earning potential while leaving them vulnerable in other 
ways. Those in the middle also rely on informal incomes, but they have a 
greater degree of choice about this. The financial capital they can draw on 
when entering the informal economy is greater. Doctors, engineers and others 
working as professionals in South Africa commonly derive significant income 
from illegal or unregistered businesses. But the formal economy gives them 
access to banking, credit, secure legal standing, regular employment, etc. 
They often obtain their work permits, their regular status, by informal and 
illegal means – at a price beyond migrants who lack significant capital 
reserves. Those at the top live almost entirely within the formal sphere in 
South Africa. Yet, in the extra-legal space that is the DRC, they can plunder 
national resources, using South Africa as a secure place to manage their 
assets.  
We now place various empirically observed occupations within these 
rough-hewn categories of ‘the bottom’ ‘the middle’ and ‘the top’.  
 
Those at the Bottom 
 
All the Congolese migrants we met at the bottom end of the social scale are 
claiming asylum in South Africa. Often arriving with a visitor’s permit, they 
claim asylum once they are admitted to the country. Asylum-seeker status has 
several disadvantages, especially no right to work while the claim is being 
processed, and most claims appear to get nowhere. Migrants in this category 
are condemned to ‘forced informality’, the most direct cause of their low social 
mobility and poverty. Other vectors of class formation, however, oblige these 
migrants to adopt such a status in the first place, above all capital. All the 
other options for remaining in South Africa, each of which leads more easily to 
regular status, involve money. Renewing a visitor’s permit requires substantial 
income, while other options carrying the possibility of working legally also 
require considerable resources and/or special skills (as we will see with 
professional migrants).  
Those at the bottom have no right to work, yet they must earn money 
to eat. Sometimes they work in purely informal occupations, as car guards, 
cutting hair on the street, prostitutes etc. Often, however, they work illegally 
for South African companies, above all in security or as bouncers and 
waitresses. These illegal jobs require access to forged papers. Gauteng has a 
reputation among the Congolese as a source of forged documents, which can 
be obtained with startling ease and very cheaply (see below). The forgers 
perform a vital role without which the lives of many Congolese at the bottom 
of Gauteng’s heap would be even more difficult. Their services are sometimes 
referred to as the ‘embassy of Yeoville’, after the Johannesburg district where 
many Congolese forgers live. 
Henri and Manassé are car park attendants working purely in the 
informal economy. They spend long hours working their pitch outside a 
shopping centre. On a good day they can make 200 rand, though the amount 
fluctuates a lot. One of their most serious problems is competition for their 
pitch, especially since in Gauteng car guarding is often thought of as a job for 
indigenous South Africans. Partly as a result, Henri and Manassé pay out a 
significant sum to a gangster who ensures that they retain their pitch. Both 
Henri and Manassé are from genuinely poor backgrounds in Kinshasa and 
seem less inclined than most to complain about their circumstances in 
Gauteng. 
Jean-Pierre comes from Kasai in the south central part of the DRC. He 
works as a guard for various properties where large amounts of cash are 
stored. He lives in Yeoville, although his job takes him to other parts of 
Gauteng. Like many security guards, he claims to have been a soldier in the 
FAZ (Forces Armées Zaïroises). This appears to be true – he has photos of 
himself as a younger man in an officer’s uniform. Most such claims, however, 
are false. The job is extremely unpleasant: Jean-Pierre has to carry a pump-
action shotgun and to work nights standing for long stretches without a break, 
always on the alert against attack. South African law on the hiring of security 
guards has been tightened in recent years and Jean-Pierre had to purchase a 
suite of false documents in order to obtain the post (see below). 
Saddam (a rather common name in the DRC) also works as a security 
guard outside a small hotel and restaurant, directing cars, dealing with 
drunken customers and the occasional wino. Compared with other security 
jobs, Saddam has it good – the premises are in a salubrious part of Pretoria, 
piles of cash are not kept on site and the clientele is solid in the main, middle-
aged and unlikely to cause trouble. The job is not dangerous and much of the 
time he can sit down, but it does involve working all night, every night, except 
Mondays.  
Like everyone we met in this class, Saddam and Jean-Pierre claimed 
asylum when they arrived in South Africa. These claims are neither granted 
nor rejected, but are renewed eternally. In 2010, when the Department of 
Home Affairs was on strike, Saddam was fined 1,000 rand for late submission 
of his renewal documents. The fine was non-negotiable even though the only 
reason for his lateness was the prolonged strike. Saddam’s asylum-seeker 
status excludes him from working in the formal economy. He is relatively lucky 
in that his employer is a fellow Central African who does not require him to 
provide large numbers of documents. This contrasts with many other workers 
in the security sector who have to procure false documents.  
Saddam and Jean-Pierre highlight the paradoxes of social mobility 
between Gauteng and the DRC. Saddam worked as a school teacher in the 
DRC and has a high school diploma and teacher-training certificate. He 
speaks very good English and spends his spare time reading novels and 
detective stories, mostly in English. Jean-Pierre was in the army. For both, 
working as security guards in Gauteng could be classed as downward 
mobility. Yet Saddam’s salary as a state-employed school teacher in 
Kinshasa was less than fifty U.S. dollars a month, much too low to live on, 
while the chaos and disintegration of the Forces Armées du Zaïre made 
survival incredibly difficult for career soldiers. As security guards in Gauteng, 
Saddam and Jean Pierre are paid 2,500 to 3,000 rand a month, an average 
wage for full-time employees in this sector. While this is very low, it is enough 
to survive on. Saddam spends about 1,000 rand on food each month, buying 
in bulk and travelling to Johannesburg (where provisions are cheaper). When 
he can, he sends home 1,000 rand to his parents and/or to the mother of his 
child, all of whom live in Kinshasa. He pays 1,000 rand a month on rent, which 
buys him space in a shared room in a downtown area of Central Pretoria that 
is popular with migrants. 
Saddam’s neighbourhood also has a large floating population; there 
are never less than fourteen people staying in this three-bedroom flat and 
often many more. The block is known as Hong Kong among local Congolese, 
because it is so crowded. It is notorious for drug deals, and the smell of Indian 
hemp often wafts past as one the crosses the communal balcony. When 
Saddam is not there, the room is used by local prostitutes. These women are, 
in the main, South African, but they seem well integrated into the Congolese 
milieu – many of them can speak passable Lingala and dance to the 
Congolese rumba in the bars. Some of them may be seen in intimate mobile 
video-phone recordings, which are passed around Congolese men in the 
area. The flat is also home to a thriving community of cockroaches and some 
people who stay there suffer from a skin condition linked to parasitic insects.  
Rents per square metre are no cheaper than in more affluent areas 
nearby, but the flats are much more crowded. Rents in dilapidated downtown 
areas – Sunnyside in Pretoria or Yeoville and Hillbrow in Johannesburg – are 
appreciably higher than in poorer outlying areas, especially in the townships. 
Despite this, the Congolese show a marked preference for living in town. One 
reason is convenience, since these districts are closer to sources of money, 
but there are also important historical and social motives. When apartheid 
ended, formerly white areas like Yeoville and Sunnyside became available to 
mixed groups, including large influxes of migrants from other parts of Africa, 
so that from the beginning these areas was not dominated by indigenous 
South Africans. This was unlike the situation in the townships, which had been 
reserved for non-whites. This trend was strengthened by the normal pattern of 
‘path dependence’ in choice of habitation (Grafmayer and Isaac 1992), 
whereby the more members of a community settle in an area, the more likely 
it is that others with social ties to them will also settle there. This is linked to a 
third reason why Congolese prefer these areas. Like other immigrants, they 
do not feel safe in the townships. These places, such as Mamelodi to East 
Pretoria or Alexandria next to Sandton, saw some of the worst xenophobic 
violence in 2008. While the inhabitants of downtown areas experienced 
considerable unpleasantness, no one ever felt under physical threat because 
of their origins. 
 
Those in the Middle 
 
Middle-class migrants constitute a large and somewhat problematic category. 
Included in this group are professional migrants, by which we mean those 
groups – essentially health professionals and engineers – who have 
continued practicing their professions in Gauteng. There are also a smaller 
number of Congolese who have found work in other middle-class occupations 
– accountants, bank clerks, lawyers, university lecturers – but in these cases 
they tend to have gone to university in South Africa and often have South 
African citizenship. In addition, there are a number of clandestine workers, 
notably smugglers and fraudsters, who are sufficiently successful to acquire a 
bourgeois lifestyle. There is also considerable crossover between these 
groups and independent businessmen. Many professionals have created 
businesses and many professionals and businessmen are involved in fraud 
and other informal and illegal activities.  
 
Professionals 
 
While many of those who migrate to Gauteng from the DRC hold university 
degrees, only a relatively narrow set of graduates are able to use these when 
living in South Africa. The two main categories are, as stated above, health 
professionals – above all doctors – and engineers. Unlike other graduates, 
these two groups have in the recent past often been able to obtain work 
permits for South Africa. Their legal status is thus essential to maintaining 
their class position once in South Africa. The routes these professionals take 
to obtain work permits are various. Engineers working in the mining sector 
were sometimes issued with work permits designed to fill skill shortages there. 
Other ways of obtaining papers are less straightforward. One common 
practice used by doctors and engineers is to retake their final qualifications – 
a practice known as kosukola diplôme, ‘to clean the degree’. This does not 
guarantee a work permit in itself, but it does give the professional connections 
that can indirectly lead to one. Hence it is not uncommon to meet engineers 
studying in South Africa who have in fact already graduated with long careers 
in the state mining sector in Congo. Spending a year or more obtaining new 
qualifications is expensive of course, and only available to those who have 
significant financial resources. 
Another route to a work permit is through claiming asylum. This too 
requires resources and connections. The procedure involves a contact in 
Home Affairs who can ensure that an asylum claimant is given refugee status 
– which grants the right to work – within a reasonably short time. We have 
heard that this service is arranged by corrupt lawyers, but one of our 
informants gave us access to a syndicate working within the department itself. 
The minimum fee was quoted as 4,000 to 4,500 rand for ‘normal’ applicants, 
although interestingly doctors were charged more for this service – a figure of 
8,000 to 10,000 rand was quoted – presumably because they are considered 
to have a guaranteed earning potential once they get the right to work.  
This illustrates an important theme of our essay. Informal and illegal 
economies are used by all sectors of the migrant population. The classes 
differ in the degree of choice they exercise and the terms of access to 
informal economies. Whereas informality is a trap for those at the bottom, 
professionals like doctors and engineers are able to turn the system to their 
advantage. This is once again related to money. These groups come to 
informality with more resources to begin with. These may be financial – while 
doctors and engineers in Congo have a hard time, they or their families can 
usually assemble the money needed for a once-off effort. They are also 
related to earning potential – doctors and engineers could commit a significant 
sum to bribing officials because they are reasonably confident of finding a job 
once they obtain a work permit. This confidence would not be warranted for 
other types of graduates in South Africa. 
Another path to gaining work used by doctors is called Locam. This is 
an informal apprenticeship that many Congolese doctors go through in 
Gauteng, thereby easing the financial burden on individuals. Junior doctors 
who have qualified in the DRC, but have not yet passed the conversion exam 
(the ‘South African Health Professionals Council Board Exam for foreign 
medical practitioners’), may work illegally for a fellow countryman who has 
established his medical practice there. In one case, the doctor – for a fee – 
provided accommodation, mentoring and information about the process of 
becoming accepted as a doctor there. 
Doctors who migrate to South Africa retain the class position they 
occupied in the DRC, but they have undergone an important material 
improvement. Doctors working for the state in the DRC are, on average, paid 
300 U.S. dollars a month, a salary that is often not paid. Within the private 
sector, salaries may be somewhat better, but there are very few positions 
available. Congolese doctors working in Gauteng by contrast quote an 
average starting salary of 25,000 rand a month. Many Congolese physicians 
in Gauteng own several properties and luxury cars, take European holidays, 
etc.  
The presence of such a large body of Congolese medics in South 
Africa, combined of course with the dilapidated state of the DRC’s health 
infrastructure, has helped make South Africa the number one destination for 
‘health tourism’ by Congolese people in need of treatments that are either 
unavailable or considered unreliable in the DRC. Indeed, some more 
entrepreneurial medics have created thriving businesses linked to this health 
tourism. One doctor has bought several flats in and around Pretoria, which 
patients may rent while they wait for treatment in his clinic and where they 
may convalesce after they are discharged from hospital. The flats are also 
rented to visiting businessmen and junior doctors from the DRC who have yet 
to get a foothold in South Africa.  
In the case of engineers, the collapse of the state mining sector in the 
1990s meant that most engineers working in the DRC lost their jobs. Thus 
migration to South Africa for them represents an improvement in their 
circumstances from many points of view. The first significant cohort to arrive 
in South Africa consisted of mining engineers who had been employed by the 
state copper mining company, Gecamines. The company ceased to function 
in the early 1990s, a collapse that coincided with the end of apartheid, 
encouraging many skilled workers to leave the DRC for South Africa. We 
have anecdotal evidence of others such as electrical engineers, architects, 
computing engineers and the like working in sectors such as 
telecommunications, construction and manufacturing. Some engineers have 
created their own companies, most often in construction, bringing together 
plumbers, carpenters and architects, while often drawing illegally on skilled 
Congolese migrants from the bottom class discussed above. It has been 
reported to us that many Congolese engineers or technicians like to have 
white South African business associates, believing that this will win them 
more clients.iii 
 
Fraudsters and Frappeurs 
 
The various groups of Congolese fraudsters and smugglers are too large to 
ignore but hard to place within the class model we have proposed here. At the 
bottom end, many small forgers and people smugglers – tata ngulu, tindikeurs 
– are not doing well at all. At the very top one finds celebrity fraudsters who 
might be categorized as belonging to the elite. While their illegal activities lay 
them open to the threat of arrest, many of the more successful fraudsters 
have been able to purchase legitimate businesses, both in the DRC and in 
South Africa, and this justifies our placing of this occupational group in the 
‘middle’ category. A frappeur (also known as maître) is someone who 
practices frappe, the French for strike. In this context frappe (and its 
numerous synonyms kop, mayuya, etc.) indicates a semantic field roughly 
corresponding to the English word fraud. Typically it would include: cheque 
fraud, known as chekula, stealing bank account details (known as internet), 
counterfeiting money (a specialism of Cameroonian criminals known as 
feymen, but often involving Congolese) document fraud, forms of resource 
fraud and so on. Some of the most successful frappeurs are very well-known; 
and several pose as successful businessmen. 
One of these, Nosy Muamba, was a former president of the Congolese 
football league. He was involved in a syndicate importing counterfeit currency 
into Zaire, a crime for which he was tried and found guilty in 1995. After the 
collapse of the Mobutu regime, he came to South Africa, where he became 
famous as the owner of a Johannesburg nightclub, Sankai. He was also part 
of a predominantly Cameroonian syndicate involved in counterfeiting. He was 
arrested once again and charged, and is currently serving a prison term. 
There is a strong association between frappe and music. Indeed for the 
last thirty years the big names in Congolese popular music have received the 
majority of their income from various forms of praise-singing for fraudsters in 
the diaspora. While many of these figures lived in Europe, South Africa has 
also played host to a significant number. One of them is Tony Kabongo, a 
practitioner of internet. Tony has been in open rivalry with a London-based 
fraudster called Zadio Kongolo who is a celebrated patron of music.iv Zadio is 
famous for giving the bandleader JB Mpiana a staggering amount of money 
during a concert in Dublin, a feat that earned him the name Zadio ‘arrêtez le 
temps’ (‘stop-time Zadio’), because it took so long for him to press banknote 
after banknote on JB’s head. At another concert, in Kinshasa, Zadio again 
gave large amounts and was hailed by the band with his nickname. Tony, 
while visiting Kinshasa for the concert, followed Zadio onto the stage and 
gave even more money, after which the quick-witted JB awarded him the 
name of ‘Tony rachetez le temps’ (‘buy-back-time Tony’). Tony is also alleged 
to have flown a Ferrari from Johannesburg to Kinshasa just to use it to arrive 
at a concert.  
The frappeur lifestyle is extremely unstable. Indeed frappe is often 
linked to witchcraft, and the precipitous decline of once-wealthy frappeurs 
suggests to many that their occult contracts have run their course. 
Nevertheless, many successful frappeurs have used their money to buy 
properties and businesses in South Africa and the DRC. Tony Kabongo was 
arrested in 2010. While most of his assets were in his wife’s name, she, on 
becoming his ex-wife, decided not to share them with him. But he had 
managed to save other assets and now lives in Mbuji Mayi and owns a toilet 
paper factory in Kinshasa. Another famous South Africa-based frappeur Bado 
Martens, ‘l’Elephant du Golf’, now owns numerous businesses in Kinshasa, 
including a construction company, a bakery and one of the largest printers in 
the city. 
Frappe has an ambivalent status for the Congolese in that, if pushed, 
most people would express the view that such activities are wrong. This view 
is reinforced by frappeurs’ occult associations. Like the musicians they 
associate with, frappeurs are perceived to be enthusiastic users of nkisi – 
immoral occult devices that draw on ancestral power to grant temporal 
success. But some fraudsters, whether resident in Europe or South Africa, 
have become cultural icons in Kinshasa. This iconic status is not directly 
related to their fraudulent activities, but is rather linked to the lifestyle that 
fraud supports – giving money to musicians, wearing the latest fashions from 
Europe and Japan, and courting famous beauties. This ambivalence contrasts 
with attitudes to crimes such as burglary, which are seen as being not only 
highly immoral, but also crass and unsophisticated. Crimes of violence are 
strongly associated in the Congolese mind with indigenous black South 
Africans – whom they see as being pointlessly violent – or with Nigerians 
whose ruthlessness in pursuit of their business interests Congolese criminals 
find it hard to condone. As one informant put it, ‘For the Nigerians it’s “you 
touch my woman, we can talk about it, but you touch my business – I’ll kill 
you”’. 
Diamond smuggling and diamond fraud are mostly performed by 
migrants from the diamond-rich province of East Kasai. One smuggler 
expressed the view that the permits required by law to import diamonds to 
South Africa were ‘pour les colons’,v a phrase we might translate as ‘only for 
the big shots’. Importers without permits obviously occupy an inferior social 
position to those who trade diamonds legally. But these traders should not be 
placed in our bottom category. Even these smaller, clandestine dealers must 
travel regularly between Kasai and Gauteng and smugglers often spend their 
money in relatively ‘bourgeois’ ways. For example, we are aware of one 
smuggler who also owns a boutique in Mbuji Mayi, the capital of East Kasai, 
which he stocks with articles purchased in Johannesburg. In this context, a 
form of fraud known as litraka has developed that exploits the clandestine 
trade in diamonds. Its practitioners form a relationship with the South African 
police. The dealer sells smuggled diamonds to a punter in South Africa who 
will then be stopped by the police and searched almost immediately after the 
deal. In this way both the fee and the diamonds are then recuperated by the 
syndicate. Sometimes persons suspected of making a deal will be reported by 
others to ‘their’ cops, in the hope of a windfall profit. This happened to us after 
drinking a beer with a well-known diamond smuggler in a Yeoville bar. As we 
left, the police arrived and without explanation or excuse immediately started 
searching us. 
 
Those at the Top 
 
We have placed two groups within the ‘top’ class of Congolese migrants in 
South Africa. The first are the so-called ‘nouveaux riches’, who made money 
from trade links to South Africa from the 1990s. The second group, ‘the 
political elite’, consists of politicians who have spent significant periods in 
South Africa or who have kept their families in the country. Their wealth and 
income is predominantly based on rents accruing to their political power. 
There is considerable overlap between these groups – many politicians 
establish family members in trade, using money acquired from rents, while 
most traders profit from rents, in part, through the quasi-monopolies they 
enjoy due to their political connections.  
 
 
Nouveaux Riches of Katanga in Gauteng 
 
‘Nouveaux riches’ refers here to a group of businessmen who have 
specialized in importing goods from South Africa into Katanga since the late 
1990s: in particular, food, drink, clothes and cars. Trade between Katanga 
and South Africa has increased exponentially since the early 1990s. Among 
the first Congolese to take up this option were truck drivers involved in illicit 
cobalt traffic (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). Katanga has the 
world’s most important reserves of this strategic mineral, which is needed for 
manufacturing precision steel. Ethnic politics in Katanga eventually caused 
the state mining company to collapse, when thousands of skilled personnel 
from East Kasai were driven out in a pogrom against ‘non-autochthones’.vi In 
this process, more and more of the mineral was smuggled abroad. On the 
way back, these drivers started filling their trucks with consumer goods, 
primarily food and clothes, to sell in Zaire/DRC. As the trade’s profitability 
became clear, a class of merchants emerged, the nouveaux riches, who 
specialized in importing goods from Gauteng to Katanga. This trade took off in 
earnest after Laurent Kabila had taken power. The nouveaux riches do not 
appear to have started South African businesses. But they use South Africa 
as a base for hoarding assets and very often keep their families there.  
Given the relatively good transport links between Katanga and 
Gauteng, one might ask why this trade only took off in the 1990s, particularly 
since extensive links between them existed before independence. The 
Katangese themselves claim that Mobutu blocked the commerce in order to 
favour the west of the country. But this is unlikely – during the late Mobutu 
period, for example, a noticeable trade developed in second-hand cars 
imported to Lubumbashi from Dubai via Tanzania and Zambia, which 
suggests that the frontier was open much of the time (Kadima and Kalombo 
1995). 
One nouveau riche, whose family is based in Pretoria, has become a 
deputy in Katanga’s regional parliament, representing the ruling party, the 
PPRD (Partie pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie). Likewise, Moise 
Katumbi, current governor of Katanga, made large profits in the 1990s from a 
monopoly on importing maize meal from South Africa into neighbouring 
Zambia (Omasombo 2009). This was in large measure due to his political 
connections to the Chiluba administration in Zambia. Such exchanges 
between economic and political power are extremely common, we believe, 
and illustrate how the division between the nouveaux riches and the political 
elite is more nuanced than it might seem. 
 
The Political Elite 
 
There is a long tradition in the DRC of elites migrating. This takes many forms 
and has many motivations. One of these is the prestige gained from installing 
oneself and/or ones family in wealthy countries. Residence abroad may also 
offer a springboard to membership in the elite. It can also act as a hedge 
against political instability, since those who fall from favour can sit out 
awkward periods in a base abroad. 
Many who became important in the Kabila regime, mostly from 
Katanga province like Kabila himself, have connections with South Africa. 
This is leading gradually to the formation of a network of elite connections, a 
power base stretching between Gauteng and Katanga. Since the late Mobutu 
era and especially after the end of apartheid, a number of Congolese 
politicians have chosen to bring their assets to South Africa. It would be 
interesting to know much these people actually invest in South Africa. For 
many, South Africa just serves as an ‘offshore’ home for gains made in the 
DRC. To be sure, large amounts are invested in physical assets such as 
property, especially in South Africa’s luxury zones. The country is clearly a 
safe haven for some sections of the elite. It can also be a springboard to a 
political career in the DRC. South Africa has sometimes operated as a space 
for migrants to make contact with, and be integrated into, Congolese elites. 
This tendency for migration to play an important role in elite formation, already 
well-established under Mobutu, was boosted further by Kabila senior. 
Although he was not consistent in this regard, Kabila seems to have 
considered that those who stayed in the DRC, especially residents of 
Kinshasa and the west, had ‘collaborated’ with the Mobutu regime. Studiously 
avoiding the opposition that had resisted Mobutu’s rule since the 1980s, he 
recruited politicians from the diaspora as a guarantee that they had not been 
‘contaminated’. His son, Joseph Kabila, is a more pragmatic politician and, 
while a group of Katangese grands form the core of the DRC’s power elite, an 
increasing number of ex-Mobutistes have also been welcomed into the upper 
echelons of government. For them a spell in the diaspora, notably in South 
Africa, has been functional for their political careers, allowing them to sit out 
periods of displeasure and retain certain assets, while time launders their 
political careers.  
Since Kabila came to power, politicians with a South African 
connection have become a feature of the Congolese political landscape, with 
some prominent ministers regularly communicating in English, informally at 
least. The new English-speaking politicians were known locally as ‘diazo 
diazo’, a term applied more widely to politicians from the diaspora. These men 
–such as Augustin Katumba Mwanke, Barnabé Kikaya Bin Karubi and Bizima 
Kahara – were appointed to the highest political functions. All of them spent 
significant periods in South Africa and were close aides of and collaborators 
with the Kabilas.  
From 1991 to 1997 Augustin Katumba Mwanke worked in various 
South African corporations, successively Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment (JCI), Bateman Minerals and Industrial Ltd, and HSBC Equator 
Bank of South Africa (as manager). Katumba’s wife trained as a doctor in 
South Africa, where she befriended a fellow student, Bizima Kahara. He 
became an important figure in the AFDL (Alliance des Forces Démocratiques 
pour la Libération) rebellion that ousted Mobutu (Bizima is a Banyamulenge, 
one of a group of Congolese Tutsi who formed an important contingent in the 
AFDL, which was then essentially a front for the Rwandan army) and the 
Kahara connection served Katumba well when Laurent Kabila took power in 
1997. He became a counsellor to the Congolese finance minister. In 1998, he 
was appointed governor of Katanga, where he developed a close relationship 
with Joseph Kabila (Omasombo 2009: 117). When Joseph succeeded his 
father as head of state in 2001, Katumba took his chance, becoming one of 
the regime’s most powerful men. Locally known as ‘le tout puissant, le 
président du gouvernement parallèle’ (‘the all-powerful chairman of the 
parallel government’), many observers cast him as Congo’s Dick Cheney, the 
man directing policy while Joseph races trucks. Katumba Mwanke certainly 
had fingers in many pies – his name was cited by the United Nations (UN) 
Panel of Experts as part of an ‘elite network’ involved in the illegal exploitation 
of the DRC’s mineral wealth (UN Panel of Experts 2001). In 2006 Katumba 
was elected Member of Parliament for Lubumbashi and, until his death in a 
plane crash in 2013, collaborated closely with the President. He held 
substantial assets in South Africa and was said to be close to the ANC. 
Recent contracts for oil exploration in Lake Victoria were awarded to two 
companies registered in the British Virgin Islands in the name of Khulubuse 
Zuma, a nephew of the South African president, and Mark Hulley, lawyer to 
president Zuma (Wallace and Mundy 2010). This oil concession runs to 
billions of U.S. dollars; and, while it is hard to confirm, this kind of 
Congo/South African elite integration appears to be taking place more widely. 
Dan Gertler, an Israeli diamond dealer who has secured many important 
mineral contracts in the DRC, and was a close associate of Katumba 
Mwanke, appears to have used a certain Mark Willcox to move some of his 
money (Congo Leaks 2011). Willcox also works for Mvelaphanda holdings, an 
investment vehicle linked to the South African minister of planning Tokyo 
Sexwhale (Brummer and Sole 2010). President Zuma was the first 
international figure to recognize the result of the 2011 DRC presidential 
elections, handing a comfortable victory to Kabila, despite the grave 
misgivings of the European Commission (2011) and the Carter Foundation 
(2011). 
A South African connection has also helped several dignitaries of the 
Mobutu era to crawl back into the fold. Several of Mobutu’s collaborators, who 
claimed asylum in South Africa in the late 1990s, have returned to the DRC 
thanks to connections made there. A notable example is Mbatshi Mbatsha, 
governor of Bas-Congo province after 2006. A native of the province, he had 
several important and profitable functions in the Mobutu era, including 
minister of works and director-general of Société Nationale des Chemins de 
Fer du Zaïre (the Zairian railways). With the fall of Mobutu he claimed asylum 
in South Africa, establishing himself in Cape Town, where he gained a 
diploma in conflict resolution and management from the University of Cape 
Town (UCT). According to rumours, he was granted South African citizenship 
on account of his numerous business interests in the country. He returned to 
the DRC to take part in the elections of 2006, when the question of his 
nationalityvii was just one controversy surrounding his election as Governor. 
Governors in the DRC are indirectly elected, that is to say that they are 
chosen by a vote of the regional legislature, a procedure that is notoriously 
open to corruption.  
Mbatchi Mbatcha was elected governor despite the large opposition 
majority in the regional assembly and his membership of RCD-Goma 
(Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie),viii a party in the government 
coalition that commanded little electoral support. Protests followed, amid 
plausible allegations of bribery, notably in quasi-millenarian demonstrations by 
a religious group, the Bundu Dia Kongo. The demonstrators were armed with 
kola nuts and sticks shaped like weapons – which they believed would turn 
into grenades and guns should the need arise. In their ‘response’ to these 
largely peaceful demonstrations, the Police Nationale Congolaise (or perhaps 
the army in police uniform) killed at least a hundred people, tortured survivors, 
looted property and desecrated places of worship (UN 2008).  
As we have shown, the Congolese political elite have been able to use 
South Africa to bank gains made from rents. These are in turn guaranteed by 
violence. Almost all ruling classes rely, at some stage, on violent 
appropriation, but South Africa (alongside other destinations) is clearly 
allowing Congolese elites to enjoy the rewards of lawlessness, while reducing 
what in other circumstances would be the concomitant risks. Insecurity has 
often spurred elites to move towards stability, if only to institutionalize gains 
made during an initial period of primitive accumulation. While the formation of 
intensive networks between the South African and Congolese political elites 
may be unsavoury, this alliance offers the prospect of a defence against 
Congo’s smaller but much better-armed neighbours – above all Rwanda,ix but 
also Angolax – and also against such behemoths as China and the United 
States, both of whom are showing a renewed interest in the Congo as mineral 
prices stabilize and the threat of a wider war recedes. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We have argued that migrants provide an important element in the strategic 
relationship between South Africa and the DRC. South Africa is likewise a 
crucial space for relations between the DRC and its diaspora. While many 
studies focus on migrants towards the bottom of the social scale, we have 
presented a wider view, insisting that migration is of central importance for the 
middle classes and for those at the top also. 
These patterns of migration are affected by the relationship between 
informality, money and power. Informality is often presented as a level of 
economic activity reserved for those at the bottom of the social scale (Hart 
2010b) and many scholars (e.g. de Soto 1989) present the challenges posed 
by informality – e.g. lack of property title – as a reason why the poor remain 
poor. We agree that economic informality plays an important role in class 
formation. But our study has also shown how all classes have an important 
relationship to economic informality. What is crucial is not whether classes are 
involved in the informal economy, but rather the terms on which they engage 
with that economy. Where those at the bottom are involved in ‘forced 
informality’ and are, as a result, compelled to take precarious and badly paid 
jobs, those in the middle are able to use informal economies to regularize 
their situation and to conduct profitable businesses, while retaining access to 
the advantages of formality – banking, credit, etc. Those at the very top, who 
have exploited a range of political rents in the extra-legal, informal space that 
is the DRC, can use South Africa to ‘bank’ these gains without much let or 
hindrance. These individuals may, if they choose, live out their time in South 
Africa as upstanding members of the community, entirely within the formal 
sphere. We believe that this analysis represents a useful corrective to the 
literature on migration and informality. Rather than assuming a priori that 
migrants have a positive or negative role to play, we need to look at empirical 
evidence. Likewise, the quasi-functionalist notion of a ‘migrant community’ is 
highly problematic. All social groups are marked by conflict and differences of 
interest, and migrants are no exception in this regard.  
We believe that many of the restrictions placed on immigration by 
those in the bottom and middle categories are simply irrational, devalue the 
contributions of essentially honest people, and probably harm the South 
African economy. For those as the top, it seems natural and inevitable that 
South African elites should see their future interests as entwined with that of 
the Congo, and Congolese elites could do worse than to make a strategic 
alliance with the South African political class. But this relationship should 
endeavour to move beyond the kind of extended primitive accumulation that it 
currently represents. The development economist Christopher Cramer (2006) 
has spoken of haemophiliac societies – places where the violence wrought by 
primitive accumulation never properly coagulates into political and social 
stability. It seems to us that if the Congo and South Africa wish to move 
beyond this haemophiliac condition, governments would do better to 
concentrate their efforts more on controlling flows of money (into tax havens) 
and less on controlling flows of people. 
 
                                                 
i MacGaffey herself rejects the term informal economy for various reasons. 
We note that subsequent literature has not adopted her alternative usage, 
which seem to us very close, if not identical, to the notion of an informal 
economy. 
ii The nationalization of the mines was successful in so far as they continued 
to operate productively into the 1990s, unlike most other sectors of the 
economy inherited at independence. The nationalization, which enshrined the 
independent management structure of the state mines, almost certainly 
protected it from the later handouts of ‘Zairianization’ undertaken in the 1970s, 
where foreign-owned property was simply given to well-connected individuals. 
The nationalization of the mines is often confused with Zairianization. Given 
that Zairianization happened several years later and was an unequivocal 
disaster, we suspect that this confusion has ideological underpinnings. 
Nationalization did not address the key issue of the downstream price that 
Zaire was getting for its Copper ores and the money paid over to central 
government by the nationalized mining sector was misappropriated. But 
                                                                                                                                           
misappropriation would have happened under a different ownership structure 
as well, indeed it would have been considerably worse. The later more 
personalized forms of redistribution – in plantation agriculture for example - 
tended to kill the goose; in the case of mining they simply stole the eggs.  
iii It is uncertain how much this reflects the real state of the construction 
industry, in terms of the need for networks when winning contracts, or whether 
it just reflects Congolese attitudes towards White people.  
iv Zadio is immortalized by J.B. Mpiana in the songs ‘Nungu Nungu’ and 
‘Zadio Kongolo’ (see Trapido 2011). 
v For the Congolese the term colon and coloniser have lost most connotations 
of colonial empire – a ‘colon’ is a ‘boss’. 
vi The Luba of East Kasai were the beneficiaries of what Turner (2007) terms 
‘differential modernization’ – having received greater access to mission 
education, they often went on to dominate the skilled professions in 
neighbouring Katanga. A more recent sub-text to the 1990s violence in 
Katanga was that natives of East Kasai were among the most implacable 
opponents of the Mobutu regime. 
vii Officially the DRC does not allow dual nationality. This is something of a 
farce as most members of the current political class hold another passport 
along with one from the DRC. 
viii Backed by Rwanda, this party at one time was a power broker in the DRC’s 
new dispensation. But a disastrous performance in the elections – where the 
Rwandan association did it no favours – left the party divided and weakened. 
It is not clear now whether the party is in opposition or government. 
                                                                                                                                           
ix South Africa has devoted significant troops to the UN effort to dislodge the 
Rwandan-backed M2F rebels in South Kivu. Rwanda’s political elite has been 
financially dependent on mineral flows from Congo to maintain their lifestyle 
and fund the army. The UK has been the largest bilateral aid donor to the 
Rwandan regime for over a decade. 
x There have been frontier skirmishes with Angola in recent years. At least one 
and probably two of Angola’s most profitable oil-producing offshore blocks are 
almost certainly in Congolese territorial waters. The Angolan elite have made 
Jdark threats whenever the issue has been broached. 
